VE and contextualism
I've been wondering whether a virtue-epistemologist can be a contextualist. Greco thinks so, and gives a case for this. His view, though, falls within the "virtue reliabilist" camp; I wonder what the prospects would be for a virtue responsibilist (specifically) to embrace contextualist semantics for "know." In his Stanford Encyclopedia entry on VE, Greco suggests that a virtue responsibilist account (namely, Zagzebski's) might be amenable to contextualist semantics by supposing that the "because" in her definition (i.e. the agent has to reach the end of the intellectually virtuous motive "because" of features of the act of virtue) could be understood as requiring stronger conditions in different contexts.
I'm not sure what to make of this claim; does anyone know of particularly good articles (aside from Greco's entry in 'Knowledge, Belief and Character) that shine light on the prospects of a virtue-responsibilist account being amenable to contextualist semantics?